Addressing financial markets without having a ' idea of \u200b\u200b returns che possono offrire è un po’ come navigare senza avere con sé le carte nautiche, con la differenza che il secondo comportamento è punito dalla legge mentre il primo non lo è. L’investitore, dunque, se vuole evitare naufragi, non può fare affidamento su vincoli esterni ma solo su se stesso. Sembra facile e invece si tratta di uno scoglio in più che per molti risulta arduo superare.
C’è anche un’altra complicazione. Le mappe dell’investitore non si riferiscono al mondo fisico, con la sua relativa chiarezza e stabilità. Vengono dalla storia , una maestra spesso inascoltata.
Come diceva Antonio Gramsci , "The illusion is the most tenacious weeds in the collective consciousness: the story teaches, but not students."
In fact, most investors chasing mirages and feeds on self-deception.
the warnings but I would add a boost: the investor who is willing to learn from history now has at its disposal more resources than ever before.
One of these, the best is Stocks for the Long Run of Jeremy Siegel, a book which was released a few months, the fourth edition is completely updated and expanded with new chapters (the third edition 2002, was published in Italian in 2003 under the title financial performance and investment strategies ).
Shares, the best investment
The last effort of the Wharton School professor - arrivatami America these days - has led me to revise a post, cycles and market returns , I wrote at the beginning of this blog and in which Estimates of Siegel on yields of shares and bonds in the last two centuries, thinking a bit 'up (call to re-read that post, because here I'm going to deeper issues that I mentioned just there, but I will ignore completely somewhere else - although important - which a year ago I stopped).
I wrote then that "real returns of the shares (adjusted for inflation) have been very consistent over time, and far higher than any other asset class."
The history of financial markets teaches us, then, that "there is nothing in the long run more profitable and safer than a diversified investment in equities."
This is, in essence, the lesson of Stocks for the Long Run . But Let us see in more detail e con l’aggiunta di qualche utile precisazione, partendo dai dati essenziali, che ho raccolto nella tabella qui sotto.
Siegel ha ricostruito la performance delle principali classi di asset per il mercato americano dal 1802 a oggi (azioni, bond ossia titoli del Tesoro a lungo termine, T-bill ovvero titoli del Tesoro a breve termine, oro).
Ai rendimenti nominali ha sottratto il tasso d’inflazione (indicato nell’ultima colonna) al fine di ricavare i rendimenti reali . Si tratta di total returns , e cioè di rendimenti che tengono conto del reinvestimento di interessi, dividendi e capital gain.
The two centuries have been divided into three sub-periods: the 1802-1870 when America was an "emerging market", the 1871-1925 in which America became the first power in the world, in 1926-2006 that America has consolidated its leadership through dramatic ups and downs, like the crisis of 1929 and the Great Depression, World War II and the economic boom that followed.
The postwar period has been further broken down into three shorter periods, corresponding to the recent bull and secular bear market in the stock market: 1946-1965 (bull), 1966-1981 (bear), 1982-1999 (bull).
The lessons of history
We are now ready to derive from the table a number of key observations:
a) The performance of dominates the actions of other assets. Siegel calculates that an equity investment of one dollar in 1802 would have reached a value of $ 12.7 million at the end of 2006.
By comparison, all other assets obtained disappointing results. A dollar invested in bonds generates a return of only $ 18.235, a dollar invested in T-bill not exceed $ 5.061, a dollar invested in gold stops at $ 32.84, providing barely maintaining the purchasing power of the original.
b) In the long term (ie for periods exceeding 50 years), the return on shares is extraordinarily stable , close to that 6.8% real which is the average for the two centuries covered study by Siegel that for sixty years more recently, by the end of World War II to the present. That
6.8% acts as an anchor for the markets, so much so that two analysts of the first magnitude as Andrew Smithers and Stephen Wright , in their book Valuing Wall Street , the ' called "Siegel's constant". What is should yield such stability is not clear. A convincing theory for now, does not exist.
c) The constancy of performance of the shares is in contrast to the great instability of bonds, both long-and short-term. Over the past 80 years, bonds and T-bill were affected before low interest rates during the Great Depression, then the high inflation of the '70s.
Overall, the transition from low and stable inflation era of the gold standard the highest price dynamics of the era of fiat money (or legal tender) has depressed real returns of fixed income securities.
d) L ' gold has followed the trend over time in the general level of prices in the economy. In periods of high inflation protection offered , but nothing more. In the long run its real yield has been shown to almost zero.
e) Returning to actions, stability of yield in the long run gives way to a variability of results is more pronounced as it reduces the 'time horizon . The
volatility in equity markets in the short term is unknown. As is well known that it tends to be more pronounced in downturns, when the economy is in recession. But the table also shows that for periods of ten or twenty years, stocks have offered returns very different from the norm. In
bull market of 1982-1999, the most extraordinary in the history of the Stock Exchange, the average return was a real extraordinary 13.6% per annum. But the market cycle was followed by the disappointment suffered by investors in the previous fifteen years, between 1966 and 1981, when the annual real returns were negative even ( -0.4%).
should be added that in the last two centuries, the longest period of negative real returns for the stock market did not exceed 17 years, while bonds had negative returns for cycles of 30 years.
f) When is therefore that the investment in shares can ensure both high profitability relative constancy of results? Siegel's studies show that to achieve this ideal condition, where the high performance is married to the low risk , the investor must go over a twenty-year horizon.
E 'beyond this threshold, it is stated that the equity markets, until now, without exception, the principle of regressione verso la media ( mean reversion ), per cui a fasi caratterizzate da rendimenti inferiori alla media ( bear market secolari) seguono fasi di rendimenti superiori alla media ( bull market secolari), e viceversa.
Grazie alla mean reversion dal 1871 le azioni hanno fatto meglio delle obbligazioni nel 95% dei periodi ventennali e nel 100% dei periodi trentennali . L’ultimo ciclo trentennale in cui i bond, nel mercato americano, riuscirono ad avere un rendimento medio annuo superiore a quello delle azioni si concluse nel 1861 , prima della guerra civile. Poi, un evento simile non was repeated.
g) From the above, and the above table, we can derive some guidance for future ? In a world of legal currency, monetary stability which is subject to political influence, the bonds probably will not be different But from the very middle of the last 80 years, nominal yields between 4% and 5%, inflation between 2% and 3%, real returns of around 2%.
And actions? The table shows how the super-bull market of 1982-1999 yields declined in recent years are gone but not enough to bring them into line with the average long-term: 9,0% medio del periodo 1982-2006 resta al di sopra del 6,8% storico.
Un modo speculare di affrontare questa questione parte dall’osservazione che al rendimento del 6,8% corrisponde un P/E di mercato di circa 15 volte . Quello è il livello medio, il fair value di lungo periodo. Ma il mercato azionario americano continua oggi a scambiare a un multiplo ben più elevato. Resta, cioè, sopravvalutato .
Siegel , per la verità, ritiene che i più bassi costi di transazione, le minori tasse, la maggiore facilità a diversificare i portafogli internazionalmente e la maggiore stabilità macroeconomica siano tutti fattori che potrebbero giustificare più alti multipli di equilibrio da qui in avanti, forse prossimi a 20 volte piuttosto che a 15 volte gli utili.
Se così sarà, i rendimenti reali attesi potrebbero scendere verso il 5% nel lungo periodo dal 6,8% del passato. Se invece non sarà così, il mercato potrebbe dover completare il bear market iniziato nel 2000 ed eliminare in tal modo la residua sopravvalutazione prima di riprendere un nuovo ciclo espansivo.
Nell’uno e nell’altro caso, ritorni reali non inferiori al 5% annuo garantirebbero la permanenza di un equity premium , e cioè di un vantaggio dell’investimento equity than bonds, at least 3 points , unless the war but in line with the average of the last two centuries.
U.S. markets and international markets
remains to be addressed, in conclusion, one last question. All the analysis done so far concerns the American market. But who assures us that it is also important to invest in other countries? After all, the U.S., over the past several decades, there have been a reality at all typical. They were instead the richest country in the world, the only true superpower.
doubt is legitimate but fortunately there are those who demonstrated both in substance and unfounded.
Three British economists - Elroy Dimson , Paul Marsh and Mike Staunton - published in 2002 a research on stock returns and long-term debt in 16 countries , titled Triumph of the Optimists : 101 Years of Global Investment Returns .
results, updated to 2006 are summarized in the chart below, taken from Global Investment Returns Yearbook 2007 , by ABN Amro .
As you can see, the returns on shares and bond, in the U.S. Were above average but not by much. Three out of 16 countries have done better than them Sweden, Australia and South Africa. countries in the bottom of the standings ( Belgium, Italy , Germany, France , Spain, Japan ) are, in general, including those who suffered the most devastating destruction during the two wars world.
Worst of all, when looking at stocks and bonds in the complex, is the result of 'Italy with an annual real return of only 2.6% for equities and negative, of' 1.8 % , for bond. Will perhaps explain why the task of another post. The effects of war, Italy has joined a protected economic system, corporate, statist, which has generally paid little and not so much the shareholders that holders of public debt.
For Italian investors that these results provide one more reason, if any were needed, to appreciate the benefits of portfolio diversification outside the narrow borders.
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