Bloomberg.com today published an interesting news on new guidelines that Merrill Lynch has established for its equity analysts. From now on every one of them will be assigned a rating of sell (sell) at least 20% of the securities under coverage. The neutral and buy (buy) shall not exceed, respectively, 30% and 70% of the shares.
Currently, only 12% of the ratings issued by analysts at Merrill Lynch is a sell, a percentage much lower. The same article reported that each year the securities that have a trend of declining prices are 37% of the total. Obviously, the more numerous still are the ones who end up appreciating however to do worse than the market indexes.
E 'should be noted that Merrill Lynch is different in some way for his "serious" than the average. Overall, in fact, among analysts of investment banks and brokers on Wall Street of the rating sell are only 5% del totale , una quota risibile e di per sè sufficiente a definire la credibilità di queste raccomandazioni.
Ma qual è il motivo che ha spinto i vertici di Merrill a rivedere i criteri cui si deve ispirare la sua ricerca azionaria?
Secondo gli esperti citati nell’articolo, la terza maggiore banca d’investimento americana intende seguire la strada già imboccata da Goldman Sachs e venire incontro alla richiesta che arriva dalla clientela istituzionale più importante e più ricca – gli hedge fund , sempre a caccia di idee su titoli da vendere allo scoperto . Goldman, al momento, ha un rating di sell sul 15% delle actions followed by its analysts.
What to say? There is little in this motivation that can reassure small investors, so far often led into extravagant investment decisions by over-enthusiastic recommendations of sell-side analysts , then uncritically disseminated and freely from the financial media.
will not be a punch in the most negative rating, fed to those who short selling, solve the basic problem for the normal retail investor, namely the fact that this kind of "advice" not responding all their needs.
In a good book, Treasury of Investment Wisdom , Dean LeBaron offriva qualche anno fa suggerimenti (rivolti in primo luogo agli investitori istituzionali, ma estendibili in certa misura a chiunque) su come scegliere dei manager o dei consulenti per la gestione dei portafogli. Il tutto si condensava nella regola delle cinque “P”: (qualità delle) persone, performance, procedure, prodotti, principi.
L’ultimo e più decisivo dei criteri attiene dunque ai “ principi ”, e cioè: il consulente da cosa è motivato, da “passione per la sfida intellettuale, denaro, altruismo o egoismo, ego, collegialità ”?
Così concludeva LeBaron: "In selecting a manager or investment adviser, discusses those principles. If you find that there are, run like hell. But if we are but are not for you, go away quietly. Finally, assess whether they are consistent with your value system, and if other "P" are also present in a satisfactory way, stop: find what you're looking for. "
The news appeared on Bloomberg today, with its significant kit data does not reveal anything sensational for those who know the markets.
In the case of many small investors but perhaps can be used to refresh a useful warning: when you read a credit rating issued by this or that broker about this or that title, forget it.
E 'a suit that was tailored for the needs of the bank and its rich clients: buy when there is to grow the investment banking fees, sell when it comes to placing some ideas for the short selling hedge funds. In both cases, small investors, not for you.
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